Wednesday, August 5, 2009

Wednesday's Abbreviated Links

Sorry for the late posting. We are still working out the kinks at Inoculated Investor headquarters. As of tomorrow we should be up and running at full speed.

Richard Thaler’s lastest piece in the FT: I found this link on Simoleon Sense. In this article, the most famous behavioral scientist Richard Thaler discusses Justin Fox’s new book called The Myth of the Rational Market and undertakes his usual assault on portions of the efficient market theory (EMH). Thaler argues that the “Price is Right” component of the EMH has failed to hold true in the three most recent bubbles: Japanese real estate, US technology, and US real estate. Can we finally lay the idea that the market always comes up with the correct price to rest? Markets may be efficient and rational most of the time but the recent lasting distortions should be the final nail in the coffin for this theory. However, Thaler does say that the “No Free Lunch” principle of the EMH has actually been strengthened by this crisis. Just because you can’t see the risk every day does not mean there is none and investors should not expect to be rewarded for taking on what appears to be minimal risk.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/efc0e92e-8121-11de-92e7-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

Deutsche Bank continues to be bearish on US real estate: This time is it not Richard Parkus who has been sounding the alarm regarding to the impending commercial real estate bust. The dour projection that by 2011 48% of US homeowners will be under water on their mortgages comes from Karen Weaver and Ying Shen. The DB duo is especially concerned about prime conforming loans, the type that get bought up by Fannie and Freddie. They expect 41% of these loans, which make up 2/3rds of total mortgages, to be underwater by 2011, up from about 14% now. The total forecasted decline for US real estate would be 41.7% if the analysts predication of another 14% drop occurs. Now, this all may sound a bit draconian, especially given the ongoing green shoot PR campaign. However, for those of you who believe that we are not going to see a sustainable recovery until housing turns around it is important to understand the inputs the DB analysts are using to make these projections.

http://www.streeteasy.com/nyc/talk/discussion/13584-deutsche-bank-about-half-of-us-mortgages-seen-underwater-by-2011

Is this a false or real dawn? American Express reported some news today that could be seen as very good when it comes to consumers. Write downs due to uncollectable debts fell to 9.2% in July from 9.9% in June. The reason it is tough to know whether this reversal is a temporary blip or a lasting trend is because of the government stimulus. I want to see what the charge offs look like when the government is done handing out checks. You all know I am very bearish but if we actually start to see less stress on the consumer even I will admit the presence of a legitimate green shoot. Accordingly, the monthly trust data releases from the credit card companies are incredibly important to monitor and scrutinize.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=au.4up9BXQ1M

(Picture of Richard Thaler courtesy of chicagobooth.edu)


Tuesday, August 4, 2009

Coming to you live from sunny Santa Monica

Well, Inoculated Investor headquarters has officially moved to the west coast. I don't anticipate the quality of the content to suffer or my dedication to the site to dissipate. I actually hope the warm weather inspires me to provide even more valuable material. So, here's to the start of my new life in California. I am still in the process of getting an internet connection for my new apartment so forgive me if the posts are sporadic over the next few days.

Best and worst commercial real estate deals: Anyone who follows my blog knows that I am very concerned about the state of the commercial real estate market. I fear that the regional banks still have significant exposure to CRE loans that may turn disturbingly toxic. Having said that, not all CRE-related deals go bad. The Real Deal put together a list of the 15 best and worst deals. Here are a few I thought were interesting:

Best:
1. Bruce Ratner's pending purchase of the Vanderbilt Yards site in Brooklyn from the MTA for $100 million
2. Developer Avi Shriki’s 10-year contract to rent out his failed luxury project in Crown Heights as a shelter for the homeless

Worst:
1. Boston Properties' purchase of the GM Building for $2.8 billion, or $1,473 per square foot
2. Tishman Speyer's purchase of Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town from MetLife for $5.4 billion

http://therealdeal.com/newyork/articles/the-best-and-worst-deals

Double dip recession on the horizon? This is a post from Naked Capitalism I got from Seeking Alpha. In this piece Edward Harrison does a nice job of explaining why we could see a technical recovery and discussing the most recent previous double dip recession in the early 1980's. He argues that at a certain point the economy could just stop falling and even if the consumer numbers continue to be weak, government spending (as it did in Q2) could add a lot to GDP. The problem is that if the consumer is under constant pressure to rebuild his or her balance sheet and then government spending tails off, the excess capacity in the economy could lead us back into a recession.

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/08/what-does-double-dip-recession-look.html

Martin Hutchinson takes on China again: Here is this week's missive from The Prudent Bear in which he continues his crusade to warn us about what is going on in China. Here is a little teaser that should entice you to read the entire thing:

"Shares are trading at 35 times earnings. Banks in the last six months have lent more than the entire Gross Domestic Product for the period. Interest rates are below the inflation rate, while monetary growth is far above it. The seven largest bond transactions in the world in 2009 were domestic deals in this country.

Looks like a bubble to me, and bound to end in tears. In a Western economy, one would be sure of it. So why should we think China's different, and what would be the effects of a Chinese economic meltdown?"

I am going to keep posting material that questions the sanity of pumping billions of dollars into the Chinese stock and real estate markets so that no matter what wonderful GDP numbers the Chinese come up with you keep in mind the potential for a nasty bubble popping.


http://www.prudentbear.com/index.php/thebearslairview?art_id=10256

Curious to learn more about the writers at Zero Hedge? Check out this link in which Tyler Durden gives some background on himself and his colleagues as well as the reasons for starting the blog. No matter what you think of the crude language, anonimity, and bearish take on the world economy, it is hard to argue that Zero Hedge has not created a very positive outlet for free speech in the blogosphere. These are troubling times and all investors need access to information that they agree with and disagree with. It is the only way to stimulate valuable debate that could help us get out of the current crisis.

http://wallstcheatsheet.com/?p=1118

(Picture courtesy of www.legendsofamerica.com)

Monday, August 3, 2009

Today's Good Reading

Not sure what the FDIC is waiting for: Two banks that were two of my favorite shorts over the last few years are in serious trouble: Guaranty Financial (GFG) and Corus Bankshares (CORS). As Karl Denninger indicates in this post, GFG’s core capital ratio was negative 5.78% as of March 31, 2009. You read that right, their liabilities are greater than their assets. In normal times, when a bank gets into this much of a hole, the FDIC acts quickly to take the bank over to try to preserve any remaining value. This is one way in which the FDIC tries to mitigate the damage of the bank’s failure to its insurance fund. But now, with GFG, CORS, and Colonial BancGroup (CNB) all on the ropes, the FDIC may be afraid that the failure of all three would completely deplete its insurance fund and force it to run to the Treasury to tap its existing credit line. According to the FDIC’s website, as of the latest filings CORS had $7.16B in deposits, CNB had $20.27B, and GFG had $11.72B for a grand total of about $39.15B in deposits. These are not small, insignificant banks. If it is accurate that the FDIC’s fund is down to $15B, then the combined failures of these bans would wipe out the remaining balance if loss rates of 40% or more were experienced. This is scary for a number of reasons, but in my view the worst part is that every day the FDIC waits the less these banks could potentially be worth and the more insurance the FDIC will need to cover depositors. My guess is that the FDIC is looking for other banks to step in and takeover the deposits but with so many banks capital constrained they may be finding it hard to locate suitable candidates.

Update: Looks like the offices of CNB have been raided by the FBI. Maybe they got sick of waiting for the FDIC to act…

http://market-ticker.denninger.net/archives/2009/08/02.html

What the “new normal” will look like: This guest post from Zero Hedge lays out the issues facing American consumers and businesses in a concise and understandable manner. If you want a very logical and sober minded assessment of what the US will look like going forward, I highly suggest that you read this short piece from Saxo Bank. In brief, the authors explain the progression of the boom and bust cycle, identify the contributing factors, and most importantly analyze what the implications of the bust will be. It seems unambiguous that consumption will be down as Americans are forced to save more and consequently corporate revenues and profit margins will be down for a sustained period. Even though this could be painful, I think once consumptions stabilizes at a lower level and people have larger savings, the US will be able to again realize moderate GDP growth. But until this rationalization occurs I find it hard to believe we will see a sustainable recovery.

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/guest-post-savings-vs-profits

James Surowiecki on foreclosures: I found this new piece from The New Yorker on Simoleon Sense. The article doesn’t contain much that those of who have been vigilantly following the housing bust don’t already know. But, there was one section that I found both interesting and somewhat misleading. In discussing the continuing failure of government polices to halt foreclosures and keep stressed borrowers in their homes, Surowiecki writes:

But the biggest problem may be that the programs are based on a faulty assumption: that modifying mortgages makes everyone—borrowers and lenders alike—better off. The idea is that since renegotiating a mortgage saves banks the hassle of foreclosing on a house, watching it sit empty, selling it at a bargain-basement price, and so on, renegotiation makes economic sense for lenders. Give lenders a nudge to start acting sensibly, and you can stop foreclosures at a relatively small cost.

It’s a comforting idea. Unfortunately, it isn’t true. In fact, according to a recent paper by economists at the Boston Fed, foreclosing is often more profitable for lenders than renegotiating is. There are two reasons for this. First, about thirty per cent of delinquent borrowers “self-cure”—after missing a payment or two, they get back on track without any help from the bank. Second, between thirty and forty-five per cent of people who do have their mortgages modified end up defaulting eventually anyway. In both cases, modification leaves the bank worse off. Reluctance to modify mortgages isn’t always a matter of obstinacy or ineptitude. It’s a matter of profit: banks are doing what makes sense for their bottom line.

The high re-default rate when it comes to modified mortgages obviously provides a disincetive for banks to negotiate with borrowers. But, let’s not kid ourselves. Nothing about foreclosure is “profitable.” I know that the author is describing profitabilty in a relative sense, but to clarify this point I think he also needs to explain that foreclosures can lead to severe losses, especially in areas in which prices have dropped dramatically. Also, negative amortization loans often cause the loan balance to be significantly higher than the value of the house. There is no question that individual bank’s incentives are likely the root cause of the failure to halt foreclosures. Banks aren’t necessarily being evil or stubborn. They are constantly comparing the costs and benefits of foreclosures versus modifications. However, readers who are not familiar with the costs of foreclosures and the damage to the value of the house that can occur during the long process need to remember that banks are still losing money on many of these reposessions, just maybe a little bit less than they do when modifcations don’t work out. So, this is not data that should be looked at as bullish.

http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2009/08/10/090810ta_talk_surowiecki

Hussman’s latest commentary: It’s Monday and that means that we can all look forward to words of wisdom from John Hussman. Today John gives those of us who have missed the gigantic rally in equities a reason to feel better about our investing acumen:

Investors can point to various indicators that “flashed buy signals” near the March lows. The problem is that many of those also went positive during last year's plunge and then failed spectacularly (as also occurred in late January). More importantly, we can't find factors that would have made us more constructive since March and that would also have improved long-term returns if applied consistently on a historical basis.

Not that it excuses my paralysis during the freefall in stock prices in early March that led to some pretty ridiculous valuations, but I do take some solace in the fact that the “buy signals” at the time could have failed just as miserably as they did multiple times during the bear market. But, more importantly, I have learned a valuable lesson. I clearly see the importance of having done research on companies that you would like to own at a lower price so that when the market gets irrational you are able to pounce on the opportunity without worrying too much about the valuation of the overall market. As my buddy Steve always says, better to learn these lessons now when there are only a few zeros involved.

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc090803.htm

Forget your tiny NYC apartment and move to Florida where you can have an entire floor to yourself: I found this bizarre story on Seeking Alpha. Apparently there is a 32 story building in Ft. Myers, Florida that has a singular tenant. That’s right, there is only one family living in the entire building. If you were wondering if the excess capacity in the Ft. Myers housing market was disappearing, I think you have your answer. This is just one anecdote but for anyone looking for reasons to call the bottom in the housing markets in the sunshine states I suggest being very cautious with your prognostications.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ix6lwVs3qo0CM3sMVD_bXQcXGFBgD99Q9J380

(Picture courtesy of FDIC.gov)

Sunday, August 2, 2009

How do we Regain Confidence in Financial Professionals?

Over the course of the last few years, many investors have lost confidence in financial professionals as a group. From advisors to money managers, the volatility of the global markets combined with the increasing complexity of financial products has led investors to question the aptitude of and the incentives that drive these professionals. At the forefront of this movement to re-examine the value added by the money management industry as a whole is Vanguard's founder John Bogle. Through a number of speeches and interviews, Bogle has been very candid regarding his perception of the failure of money manager to keep their clients’ best interests at the top of the list of their priorities. In an April interview with Gretchen Mortenson in the New York Times, Bogle had this to say:

“We [the mutual fund industry] own all this stock but we pretty much do nothing… Given their forbearance as corporate citizens, these managers arguably played a major role in allowing the managers of our public corporations to exploit the advantages of their own agency.”

Along with questioning their motives, Bogle blames mutual fund managers and Wall Street analysts for not being able to foresee the substantial issues that were developing within financial companies as the credit crisis got more severe:

“How could so many highly skilled, highly paid securities analysts and researchers have failed to question the toxic-filled, leveraged balance sheets of Citigroup and other leading banks and investment banks?”

His proposed solution to the above mentioned failures is one that I tend to agree with in principle. The fiduciary standard in the United States is taken very seriously and those who are bound by this code are liable for any breaches of their duty. However, institutional money managers do not have the explicit requirement to act as fiduciaries for their clients. In fact, there are a number of conflicts of interest that often preclude individuals at certain institutions from acting solely in the best interest of shareholders.

In the face of all this, Mr. Bogle suggests that we force our agents to relearn what being a fiduciary means. A fiduciary, these managers seem to have forgotten, acts for the sole benefit and interest of another. We need to replace the agency society with a fiduciary society, he argues.

To achieve this, Mr. Bogle says, the government must apply a federal standard of fiduciary duty to institutional money managers. This would force them to use their stock holdings as a cudgel, to demand that directors and executives of corporations honor their responsibilities to their owners.

“We need Congress to pass a law establishing the basic principle that money managers are there to serve their shareholders,” Mr. Bogle said. “And the second part of the demand is that fiduciaries act with due diligence and high professional standards. That doesn’t seem to be too much to ask.”

To be fair, there are plenty of money managers who believe they have a fiduciary duty to their investors and shareholders, regardless of whether there is an explicit obligation or not. Hedge fund managers in the mold of Baupost Group’s Seth Klarman are often very articulate in their explanations of how they put shareholders first. The problem is that the fee structures of many hedge funds and mutual funds incentivize managers to attempt to maximize their own profits, sometimes at the expense of their investors. These perverse incentives often cause the most devastation at firms that are asset gatherers, use excessive amounts of leverage, or have limited risk controls. This is why Bogle believes that money managers should be held to a fiduciary standard. If financial professionals were held personally liable for taking unnecessary risks, creating conflicts of interest with their shareholders or blatantly acting on their own behalf, then maybe investors would achieve better risk-adjusted returns and face less risk of permanent capital impairment.

Sounds great, right? We apply the fiduciary standard that exists for many other professionals to money managers and all of a sudden they are forced to focus on shareholder welfare. Assuming these people are competent and suitably skilled, this has to be good for investors, right? Maybe holding people accountable would not have completely prevented the current crisis, but one would assume that at least on the margin this would have been a positive. I sure thought so but now I am concerned that this potential solution may not be anywhere near enough.

Specifically, in this weekend’s New York Times, there was a fascinating article by Paul Sullivan that makes Bogle’s somewhat simplistic proposal look inadequate. What if the poor performance of money managers in 2008 and early 2009 was not all due to volatile markets, conflicts of interest, the lack of due diligence, or greedy individuals? What if the main driver was incompetence or insecurity?

Mr. Crosby [of Pricewaterhouse Coopers] said the survey questioned managers who advised clients with $500,000 to $20 million.

Of that sampling, only 7 percent said they felt strongly that they had received adequate training to complete their job to the highest standard. A little more than half said they felt they had received some training. What is shocking is the rest — some 36 percent of wealth managers surveyed — said they believed they were not fully qualified to do their job.

Over 1/3rd of people who worked at the 238 private banks and wealth management firms in the survey admittedly felt that they were not qualified to do their jobs???!!! That number is astonishing. If this is a representative sample, it is no wonder that people have lost faith in the money management industry as a whole. They don't even have faith in themselves. This suggests to me that the combination of a lack of training and insecurity among money managers has played a significant hand in the poor performances of many funds over the last few years. In uncertain markets, people who do not feel qualified to advise clients are likely to become paralyzed and the inaction that results could be devastating to the portfolios they oversee. Free falling markets like the ones we saw after Lehman’s crash in 2008 and in the early parts of 2009 are challenging for the most secure and experienced manages. I can only imagine how hard it was for the 93% of people from the aforementioned survey that did not feel as though they had received sufficient training.

This data certainly complicates Bogle’s solution to the problems in the money management industry. The combination of conflicting incentives, poor training, and unqualified managers is a scary trifecta for investors. In this case establishing a fiduciary standard only would potentially solve part of the problem. If managers did not have the necessary skills or confidence to navigate treacherous markets and preserve their clients’ wealth, then all we would end up doing is trying to hold people liable for incompetence. From an investor’s perspective, there is no difference between losing all of your savings due to a manager’s insufficient aptitude and his attempt to maximize his own profits by taking on excessive risk. You are out of luck in either case.

In conclusion, I think the results of the study argue for more training for money managers and potentially even standardized tests to evaluate knowledge and even temperament. It seems clear to me that in-house training programs, certifications like the CFA and MBA degrees are not enough to guarantee that these professionals are qualified to manage millions of dollars of clients’ assets. Maybe along with a fiduciary standard, the leaders of this country could develop a systematic way to continually teach and challenge those who we entrust with our money. I know that in some other professions, even experts have to pursue continuing education courses and take periodic re-assessments of their skill sets. Without some kind of reform I fear that we are doomed to have money managers who are not qualified to advise clients in the most benign markets, let alone the turbulent markets that we face today.

(Picture courtesy of Mark Lennihan of the Associated Press)

Saturday, August 1, 2009

Saturday Links


Loyal Readers,

My advice for the day is to keep doing your own work. Don't rely on the direction of the stock market to lead you to investment decisions. Smart investing still requires disciplined digging. Be skeptical of news that both fits your beliefs and that goes against your views.

On that pleasant note, enjoy today's links:

1. FASB looks the redeem itself: As discussed by Bloomberg’s Jonathan Weil, the FASB looks poised to drop a bombshell on the banking industry. After bowing to Congressional pressure to ease the mark to market accounting rules for financial companies earlier this year, the FASB appears to be putting together a proposal that would require more assets to be marked at fair value. By ending the distinction between held to maturity and held for sale assets, if passed, this change could cause all financial assets to be valued at fair or market value. What this means is that the valuation would reflect current market conditions that may include illiquidity, which of course negatively impacts prices. As further discussed by the Atlantic’s Daniel Indiviglio (hat tip to Seeking Alpha), this could be a huge problem for banks who have been relying on mark to fantasy to keep their assets greater than their liabilities and their capital levels above the minimum requirements. I have no idea why this isn’t front page news on every financial website. Not only would the assets side of the balance sheet be hit, but also the income statement, as certain losses would appear on the income statement in a line item called Comprehensive Income. It will be interesting see what the bank’s capital levels look like if this goes through and it will be especially fascinating to compare them to what the government stress tests concluded.

http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/07/mark-to-market_is_back_--_with_a_vengeance.php


2. AIG is self re-insuring? Not sure this is a good thing: In Thursday’s NY Times, Mary Williams Walsh had a very interesting article on AIG. Anyone who has followed this never-ending saga knows that AIG has many subsidiaries all around the world. In a sense, this diversification could be a good thing. As long as they weren't interconnected and dependent on one another, multiple revenue streams from various locals could breed stable earnings. But, of course this is AIG so nothing is that simple:

“They show that A.I.G.’s individual insurance companies have been doing an unusual volume of business with each other for many years — investing in each other’s stocks; borrowing from each other’s investment portfolios; and guaranteeing each other’s insurance policies, even when they have lacked the means to make good. Insurance examiners working for the states have occasionally flagged these activities, to little effect.”

Although these subsidiaries all are required by regulators to be able to stand on their own, the fact that these companies are re-insuring against each others losses is sort of like transferring risk from one pocket to another in the same pair of pants. If nothing goes wrong then these arrangements will probably not blow up in their face. But, as we have learned over the past few years, traumatic events have the tendency to cause unexpected correlations between assets and to force hidden guarantees to be honored .

In addition to re-insuring one another, they are also so desperate for business they are driving prices down in the entire market.

“A.I.G.’s premiums have, in fact, been declining in important lines. Its ratings have fallen, and customers tend to steer clear of lower-rated insurers. To woo them back, A.I.G. has in some cases lowered its prices, competitors say. A.I.G. executives insist they would rather lose a customer than drive down prices dangerously.”

This confirms what Markel’s Tom Gayner said at the annual meeting in which he indicated that the presence of AIG’s carcass was driving down prices irrationally for the whole market. This can be dangerous for taxpayers (who now own AIG) as writing insurance for the sake of revenue likely leads to mispricing of risk. Accordingly, this is something to keep your eye on as investors and taxpayers.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/31aig.html?_r=1&sq=AIG&st=cse&scp=2&pagewanted=print

3. Read beyond the headline GDP: GDP came in at –1% versus –1.5% expected. Hurray! The recession is over and we can all go back to maxing out our credit cards and buying useless trinkets. Well, since this is not CNBC, you should expect that the data is a little less reassuring than the headline number would indicate. As highlighted by The Market Ticker’s Karl Denninger, here are a few reasons why you should be less optimistic:

1. Q1 GDP was revised down from –5.5% to –6.4%, a fact that indicates that the free fall seen in Q4 2008 continued into 2009
2. After increasing .6% in Q1, personal consumption fell 1.2% in Q2. What stimulus?
3. Real government expenditures and gross investment increased 10.9%. This is not at all surprising but we would all be much better off if that spending was coming from the more efficient private sector
4. Private business inventories decreased by $141.1B in Q2 versus a $113.9 drop in Q1. Wait, I thought companies were rebuilding inventories? I thought we were going to have a technical rebound because inventories could not go any lower? I guess not in Q2.

These are just a few data points and I suggest you do your own work. There is a lot of information out there and the tone is obviously biased by the source. Therefore I implore you to make your own assessments of the GDP data as you try to ascertain whether the current levels of stocks are justified by the underlying economics.

http://market-ticker.denninger.net/archives/1276-GDP-Uuuuggghhhh.html